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ABSTRACT
Renaissance Newark, Inc. represents a collaboration between private
sector business leaders and government officials to plan and f&cilitate
redevelopment in the downtown. For two years the Mayor, business exec-
utives, and representatives from federal and state government agencies
met to discuss objectives and to formulate a plan for revitalization of
the central business district. The resulting program will address the
physical, economic, and social problems in the downtown, and eventually,
througha filtering down process, in the rest of the city. Critical to
this approach to economic development is the receipt of federal govern-
ment funding to upgrade the Penn (train) station area, and for infra-
structure improvements in the industrial corridor and the periphery of
the business district. The funding, viewed by some business leaders as
a contingent to activity and by others as a catalyst,Lhas been committed
as part of the Federal Railroad Administration's Northeast Corridor
Improvement Project. With this condition met, its is-expected that the
rehabilitation and new construction will begin shortly.
The proposal, with its emphasis on the downtown exclusively, raises
questions about its impact on the city as a whole. Newark has numerous
and complicated problems, the existence of which is apparent only beyond
the boundaries of the CBD. The tax base is shrinking; the quality of
municipal services has declined sharply during the last ten years.
Crime is rampant: in 1980, Newark ranked second in homocides among U.S.
cities. Considering these liabilities, one must ask how the city assigns
priorities. Moreover, should the city construct a program to address
those problems, how suitable is it that that program concentrate on only
a few city blocks downtown?
This paper is written because its topic is a contemporary one, with
far-reaching implications for cities and city-dwellers. One can already
observe downtown development in Boston, Detroit, Atlanta, touted as the
sure way to overall city revitalization. And for the limited area of
the CBD, it is. But its other consequence has been to create two commun-
ities: one wealthy and white, the other poor and black; one indigenous,
the other on a 40-hour-a-week lease. The division and inevitable friction
between the "two cities" is insufferable. Residents feel betrayed, neglected
and hostile toward business and government officials. Every community
contemplating such a program should visit one of those cities: talk with
the displaced; notice the rolls of the unemployed; inventory 'the number
and type of jobs created; examine the financial statements. Then decide
who gains. The intent of this paper is to ask Newark to take that kind of
tour, to think again about how city officials will commit public resources
and to estimate the real costs of their participation in Renaissance
Newark. As this thesis strives to point out, the outcomes may not emerge
precisely as imagined, and benefits may not accrue exactly as predicted.
The payout stream may be just a bit shorter, and the beneficiaries might
be limited to the elite who inhabit the downtown.
Thesis Supervisor: Suzann R. Thomas-Buckle
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This map represents approximately one square mile within
Newark and demarcates the location of existing and proposed
office buildings
6It has been said that "wherever America's cities are going, Newark
(New Jersey) will get there first". Whether meant as a positive or
negative indicator, the meaning is the same: Newark is a bellwether
among American urban centers. In urban renewal (or its failure), in
riots, or in "white flight", Newark has led American cities. But in the
1980's, it is possible that Newark will lead in a different direction:
economic.development in the Central Business District (CBD) as a means
of urban revitalization. For in this city, business leaders and govern-
ment officials have put their heads together to create Renaissance
Newark, a coordinated effort to revitalize the Newark CBD. The program's
objective is to stimulate downtown development, and as a consequence,
to restore regional confidence in Newark, and to rejuvenate a tarnished
public image.
In the fall of 1980, Ronald W. Reagan was elected President of
the United States on a campaign that stressed "getting government out
of our lives" and relying more on outselves and the private sector. The
conservative administration wants to deregulate, decontrol, and end the
subsidization of the lives of the American people. Personal initiative
will replace federal government intervention as the means to reform
and improve our lives. Renaissance Newark appears to have a similar
theme. Existing businesses will corral their resources, and together
with assistance from all levels of government, will utilize them to
promote new business, the expansion of existing firms and the generation
of jobs to enhance the local economy.
Renaissance Newark represents a collaboration between private
sector business leaders and government officials to plan and facilitate
7redevelopment in the downtown. For two years, the Mayor, business
executives, and representatives from federal and state government agen-
cies met to discuss objectives and to formulate a plan for revital-
ization of the central business district. The resulting program will
address the physical, economic, and social problems in the downtown,
and eventually, through a filtering down process, in the rest of the
city. Critical to this approach to economic development is the receipt
of federal government funding to upgrade the Penn (train) Station area,
and for infrastructure improvements in the industrial corridor and the
periphery of the business district. The funding, viewed by some business
leaders as a contingent to activity and by others as a catalyst, has
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been committed as part of the Northeast Corridor Improvement Project.
It is therefore expected that rehabilitation and new construction will
begin shortly.
Although there are not yet any products of Renaissance Newark,
individual firms recertly have been active in development. New con-
struction has emerged in the downtown for the first time in a decade.
Firms situated in the city's highly accessible industrial meadowlands
are expanding and consolidating operations from other parts of the
metropolitan area to Newark. There are new jobs: from the notably
stable service sector, and more and more from manufacturing and light
industry. City officials believe there is reason to be optimistic
about the revitalization of Newark, for in this city even a modest
gain -- say, one hundred new jobs -- is a significant one.3
The proposal, with its emphasis on the downtown exclusively,
raises questions about its impact on the city as a whole. Newark has
8numerous and complicated problems, the existence of which is apparent
only beyond the boundaries of the CBD. The tax base is shrinking; the
quality of municipal services has declined sharply during the last ten
years.4 Crime -is rampant: in 1980, Newark ranked second in homocides
among U.S. cities.5 Considering these liabilities, one must ask how
the city assigns priorities. Moreover, should the city construct a
program to address those problems, how suitable is it that that program
concentrate on only a few city blocks downtown?
Any program directed at Newark, and especially one endorsed by
municipal administrators and business leaders, must as a matter of
course concern itself with the larger picture. That is to say, regard-
less of how the program's architects intend to delimit the target of
Renaissance Newark's efforts, the ramifications of the program will
be felt throughout the city. The question is whether those ramifications
will be directed and deliberate, or haphazard and serendipitous.
This paper is meant ot be a first step toward answering the
questions surrounding downtown redevelopment and its ramifications.
There are assumptions underlying the objectives of Renaissance Newark
that can reveal the creators' perceptions of Newark, their priorities,
and perhaps still undisclosed agendas. These assumptions, when con-
trasted with descriptive data about Newark's condition, expose the cleft:
the cleft that can precede a separation into two cities.
The paper is written because its topic is a contemporary one,
with far-reaching implications for cities and city-swellers. One can
already observe downtown development in Boston, Detroit, Atlanta,
touted as the sure way to overall city revitalization. And for the
9limited area of the CBD, it is. But its other consequence has been
to create two communities: one wealthy and white, the other poor and
black; one indigenous, the other on a 40-hour-a-week lease. The divi-
sion and inevitable friction between the two "cities" is insufferable.
Residents feel betrayed, neglected, and hostile toward business and
local officials. Every community contemplating such a program should
visit one of those cities: talk with the displaced; notice the roles
of the unemployed; inventory the number and type of jobs created;
examine the financial statements. Then decide who gains. The intent
of this paper is to ask Newark to take that kind of tour, to think
again about how city officials will commit public resources and to
estimate the real costs of their participation in Renaissance Newark.
As this thesis strives to point out, the outcomes may not accrue exactly
as predicted. The payout stream may be just a bit shorter, and the bene-
ficiaries might be limited to the elite who inhabit the downtown.
The thesis is a pre-program evaluation of Renaissance Newark. The
evaluation can be characterized as exploratory, since it focuses less
on the concrete processes and timetables than on concepts and objectives.
It is concerned with the creators' outlook, but not their aspirations,
and speculates about broad implications, not specific outcomes. The
setting, moreover, is as critical an issue in this evaluation as is
the Renaissance proposal itself. In the context of the evaluation, the
"setting" means the entire city of Newark, not merely the area dealt
with in the Renaissance plan. One of the critical questions the
evaluation asks is what will be the significance of Renaissance Newark's
efforts given the potentialities and limitations present in the setting.
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From the outset, the thesis asserts that some disparity exists
between what Newark needs and the point of view maintained by the Renais-
sance Newark participants. The illumination of this gulf, its location
and dimensions,- is merely a preliminary to the more significant dis-
cussion of the implications of cleft for the Renaissance program,
for Newark, and perhaps for other cities too.
The process was to organize the data and then try to glean from
it what assumptions are being made about Newark. The success of the
proposal is obviously contigent upon the accuracy of these assumptions.
To determine their fit vis.-a-vis. Newark, the assumptions were
analyzed in comparison with data about existing conditions in the city.
The intent is to determine in what instances the proposal represents
an accurate picture of Newark, to measure the validity of its implied
vision of the city, and to speculate on its implications.
Due to the status of Renaissance Newark at this time, it is not
possible to analyze products of the program. One can only consider
inputs: the actors, their resources, the espoused goals, and the
expressed process. The type of inputs can change; in the course of
the program all inputs may be altered. Hence, no definitive statement
about the worth of Renaissance Newark is possible. To the degree
possible, the thesis will attempt to answer the question of Renaissance
Newark's potential value in addressing the needs of the resident
population.
The investigation of Renaissance Newark begins with the proposal
and the newspaper account heralding its formulation. To answer the
questions by those reports, the author relied heavily on documentation
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and personal interviews. The documentation consists primarily of all
public documents describing Renaissance Newark; historical accounts
of urban renewal programs and private sector activities vis.-a-vis.
Newark. The Master Plans, written in 1947, 1964, and 1978, were also
reveiwed. Representatives from both public and private sectors were
interviewed. Those interviewed included principals of Renaissance
Newark, the Newark Economic Development Corporation (NEDC), the
Mayor's Policy and Development Office (MPDO), as well as spokespersons
from the Mayor's office. Among others consulted were an historian
and professor of New Jersey and Newark history, and the Director of
the New Jersey division of the Newark Public Library (who manages the
most complete collection on Newark in the state).
The interviews came to play a role of pre-eminent importance in
the collection and analysis of data. Because so little has yet been
written about the actual efforts of Renaissance, the focus turns to
perceptions and individual interpretations. Hence, the interview
became an opportunity to discern the attitude and intentions of those
who will be directly involved in the execution of the Renaissance plans.
The data is limited to the extent that officials were accessible,
and willing to speak candidly with me. There were on several occasions
conflicting opinions with regard to the role or impact of Renaissance,
the appropriate role of the private sector, and the capacity of the
public sector to enact any of the goals promoted by Renaissance.
Although these varying opinions do exist, there appears to be a general
consensus on the view inherently represented in the Renaissance Newark
proposal. Therefore, the assumptions outlined in Section III do not
12
emphasize difference, rather the consistency in viewpoint among
public and private sector participants.
The thesis does not intend to address Newark's very long and sordid
history with urban renewal. The study is not meant to be a retro-
spective. Furthermore, there are no true antecedents to development
in the CBD. Development activity in the CBD has been sporadic at
best: prior to the Public Service Electric and Gas Company construc-
tion in 1980, there had been no new construction since 1969. The study
seeks neither to vindicate nor to denounce the efforts of the business
community in particular or local decisionmakers as a whole. Rather,
the thesis zeroes in on the dilemma of the dual image of Newark: its
two populations, the commuting wealthy and the indigenous poor. It
would be far too easy for an analyst to adopt a position based on a
personal set of beliefs about the process of urban revitalization,
and then to judge Renaissance Newark accordingly. However, that route
provides no learning, but rather serves to reinforce an already confort-
able attitude.
An evaluation of a program for the revitalization of the Newark
CBD becomes a study of power and influence. It is a brief look at
the prostitution of a city by the business community upon which it
has become too dependent. It is the story of people and needs and
resources. And sadly, it is the story of too many cities, in 1981,
in America.
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Why does Newark need redevelopment anyway? The purpose of this
chapter is to explain the circumstances that created a demand for a
renewal-type program in the city. The major issues associated with the
Renaissance proposal -- namely, its incongruity with actual conditions
in Newark -- cannot be appreciated until there is first some knowledge
of the context in which Renaissance will unfold.
Summarized below is a description of the prevailing situation
in Newark with regard to the local economy, the life of the people,
and the nature of the relationship between municipal government and
the commercial business community. The chapter highlights those aspects
of the city that will be of importance further in the discussion of the
Renaissance proposal. Among the characteristics described are types
of industries and jobs they generate, where Newarkers work and how
much they earn, the quality of housing and education, the property
tax rate, and the conventional partnership between the local government
and the downtown business community.
This chapter, and the one that follows, describe the setting and
actors who will participate and be affected by Renaissance Newark.
An understaning of who and what Newark is is a prerequisite to consi-
deration of the implications of the program.
HISTORY OF THE LOCAL ECONOMY
Newark was established in 1666, and almost since then has been
the dominant urban center in the state of New Jersey. The city developed
with a broad, strong industrial base comprised of small manufacturing
firms, primarily in electrical machinery, chemicals, apparel, and
fabricated metal products. Newark's access to fine, pure water made
14
it a natural and highly successful location for beer manufacturing.
Several of the most elegant and resplendent homes to have been erected
in the city are the product of the Ballantine and Kruger family's
wealth. The Prudential Insurance Company of America, the largest
insurance company in the country and a major international financial
institution, was founded in Newark in 1875. More than 100 years later,
the firm's corporate headquarters remains in Newark.
Although the number of manufacturing firms and jobs has declined
steadily since the 1950's, this trend has been somewhat offset by the
stability of the city's financial and insurance (companies) base,
and by expansions in the public sector. While the number of manu-
facturing jobs declined to 45,000 in 1977, down from 96,500 in 1952,
the number of service sector jobs increased during the same period
1
from 74,000 to 90,700. Total jobs in Newark remained steady at 230,000
until the past decade, when the total number of jobs dropped to
2
180,000 (1977). City administrators explain the decline as an accel-
eration in the "downward population trend", 3 meaning that in the last
fifteen years outmigration has exceeded in-migration.
While stability and/or growth are exhibited in all divisions of
the economic base, the city's tax policies undercut any significant
gains. During the seven year period from 1971 to 1978, the number of
taxable properties declined by more than 11% while the property tax
rate increased by 16%.4 In 1980, the property tax rate was $10.61 per
$100.00 assessed value, reportedly one of the highest rates in the United
States. However, less than 40% of the city's property is taxable.5
Since 1968, a consistent pattern of fire, demolition, abandonment,
15
and tax foreclosure has reduced taxable property (residential, commercial,
industrial) from 48,487 line items to 38,939. At the same time, the
6
number of exempt properties has grown from 2,731 units to 8,387. The
tax burden is shifting onto homeowners who in response complain that
the quality of municipal services, especially police and schools is
poor. As the Mayor's Task Force on Payments in Lieu of Taxes concluded,
"while Newark real property taxpayers account for only 44.8% of the
value of real property in the city, they carry the full burden for
the cost of municipal services.
The principal categories of exempt properties are:
Government Buildings (federal, state, county) 25.1%
Port Authority of N.Y. and N.J. (port, airport) 44.0%
Newark Housing Authority (public housing and
urban renewal lands) 11.0%
Charitable Organizations (churches, hospitals) 8.2%
In The State of the City 8, a supplement to the 1978 Master Plan,
the economic base of the city is described as blue collar, industrial
and white collar, services in insurance, finance, and government.
A third sector, trade, includes wholesale and retail, but does not
contribute as much to the economic base as either the industrial or
service sector. As a source of jobs, the service sector (including
government) accounts for 50.2% of all Newark jobs, the industrial sec-
tor 35.6%, and trade, 14.2%.9
There are three major components of the industrial sector:
manufacturing, transportationand construction. The most prominent
is manufacturing, situated heavily in the "Ironbound" section of the
city. The manufacturing firms are small -- 85% hive less than 100
10
employees -- yet they account for 45,000 jobs. Principal types of
16
manufacturing plants are the same as they were a century ago: electrical
machinery, chemicals, apparel, and fabricated metal products.
Because of the variety of skills required, the transportation
sector typically employs a wide cross-section of the labor force.
The 14,600 transport-related jobs exist in trucking, port-related,
11
and airline associated operations at Newark International Airport.
Construction is a seasonal and economically cyclical industry
in Newark, as in the rest of the nation. Still, it contributes
3,600 jobs to the local economy and it is anticipated that proposed
new construction will create even more.12
The service sector has been the most stable aspect of the Newark
economy. Some analysts believe that because the financial, insurance,
and utilities companies function independently of the local economic
13
environment, these firms are not vulnerable to local trends. More-
over, the growth in government until quite recently has offset the
decline in "personal and related services" (defined as domestic and
household workers, and support services for the financial institutions).
In fact, government is the largest employer in this sector, supplying
32,000 jobs divided among federal, state, and local (county and city)
14
jurisdictions. In recent years, a municipal budget deficit has
forced a downturn in government employment due to cutbacks in funding,
and subsequent layoffs of personnel.
The 22,000 jobs supplied by the financial, insurance, and real
estate firms are derived primarily from the stability of the large
firms headquartered in the city: Mutual Benefit Life Insurance, the
Prudential, Blue Cross - Blue Shield, the Midlantic National Bank,
17
and the First National State Bank. Communications and public utilities,
including Public Service Electric and Gas, Western Electric Company,
15
and New Jersey Bell Telephone account for 9,000 jobs. Personal and
related services contribute 27,000 jobs.
Altogether, the service sector accounts for $175 million in
municipal valuation.
The trade sector has been heavily influenced by demographic
changes in the area. The retail core in the downtown has been adverse-
ly affected by suburban shopping centers, reduced city population, and
unrest (real and imagined) that discourages non-residents from coming
into Newark to shop. Nonetheless, this sector accounts for 28,600
jobs.16 Analysts in city hall believe that although the sector
"should not be viewed as a primary basis for revitalization effort",
the trade sector will respond to "positive reversals in other sectors."1 7
SOCIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC ASPECTS
The city has historically been ethnically diverse. Turn of the
century maps clearly delineate the ethnic neighborhoods: Italians
and Polish to the north, Portuguese and Spanish to the East, "Negroes"
in the center, and Jews in the south and western sections.18 Today
however, the outmigration of whites, and the heavy influx of Blacks
and Hispanics has led to a population mix of 65 - 70% non-white. The
propensity to exit is highest among "young middle class families of
19
all ethnic groups." These families are defined as parents aged
22 to 44, and children under the are of 15. Of those who remain,
nearly 80% could be classified low income, and 30% citywide live below
the poverty line.2 0
18
But to say that a given sector provides X number of jobs is to tell
only half the story, for of all the jobs in Newark, only 27.6% are
held by city residents. And of the 135,000 working residents of Newark,
21
only 40% work within the city. Clearly, the working population of
Newark is only minimally serviced by the local private sector. The
outstanding reason for the low number of locally employed residents
is the fact that the high number of white collar jobs (75% in the CBD)
do not match resident skills. The larger proprtion of residents are
undereducated, unskilled, and thus better suited to labor-intensive
factory work. Currently, only about one-third of the population over
age 25 has a high school diploma; the median number of years of com-
pleted schooling of persons age 25 or older is ten.22 To compound the
situation, the recent in-migration includes a disproportionate amount
of persons with limited formal education and/or non-English speaking
backgrounds. Many residents who do attain a high school diploma or
college degree leave the city.
The consequences of limited education and the mismatch of skills
to local jobs is of course, unemployment. Citywide, the unemployment
rate in 1977 was 14.9%. The distribution of resident employees by
occupational category reinforces the impact of these factors. Among
all Newark residents, nearly 60% are employed either as operatives,
clerical, or service workers. At the other end of the spectrum, less
than 10% are professionals, while less than 5% are managers.23 The
distributions are comparable within specific ethnic groups, with the
the exception of Hispanics and whites who are more often employed as
craftsmen than as service workers.
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As one might expect given the low level of education and employ-
ment skills, most Newarkers fall into the low income categories. The
1970 census documented the median income for all families in the
city as $6,191. 23.5% of families earn less than $7,000; 56.6% earn
between $7,000 and $9,000, while only 19.8% earn more than $10,000.
In a survey by ward 24, the highest income levels were found in the North
Ward, where 32.5% of families earn more than $10,000 and only 14.5%
earn less than $7,000. In sharp contrast is the Central Ward, where
in 1970, no family earned $10,000 or more and where 78.4% of families
earned less than $7,000. Since 1970, many residents have lost jobs
due to the exodus of firms from the city or the reduction in staff
among firms who have remained. Local government succumbed to a deficit
in 1975 which necessitated significant reductions among police and
educational personnel. It is anticipated that the cutback in Compre-
hensive Education and Training Act (CETA) funds will cause the loss
of several hundred jobs in Newark alone and 5,000 in the entire State.2 5
The problems of the city lock it into a reinforcing circle of
dispair: residents are ill-educated because schools are poor; schools
are so poor because funding is not available. Municipal funds are
short because the tax base is shrinking. The tax base shrinks due
to exiting firms, abandoned housing, and heavily tax-abated new
construction. New firms receive tax abatements because it is believed
to be the only way to make Newark attractive within the metropolitan
region. Newark is not competitive because its tax rates are too
high, its population is underskilled, and its reputation is that of
being decadent and dangerous.
20
PUBLIC - PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT
These problems help to explain the minimal economic development
activity of the last decade. Until the new PSE&G headquarters was
erected in 1980, no new construction had occurred in the downtown
since the Gateway complex, which broke ground in 1969. Opened in
1972, the Gateway is a cluster of hotel, office building, and several
restaurants connected to the Penn Station by an overhead tunnel. It
was financed by the Prudential, and reached 95% occupancy in 1980.
For many developers, Newark appeared neither attractive nor likely
for any sizable investment. The practice of developers buying up
and building large tracts of land downtown, was a thing of the past.
Since 1975, the city has been the major landholder and the current
process is for the city to buy the land, declare it "blighted" and thus
eligible for tax abatement, and then to sell it at less than market
rates to a developer.26 At the same time, the developer has secured
cheap, leveraged financing through the Newark Economic Development
Corporation, the city's agent for marketing and orchestrating develop-
27
ment projects.
The consensus among economic development officials -- who can
be found in a variety of governmental and quasi-public agencies such
as NEDC, MPDO, the Mayor's Development Team, the Housing Authority,
and the Housing and Redevelopment Corporation -- is that no develop-
ment will occur unless it is abated and leveraged by city funds.
Hence, financing practices imply that need is not a prerequisite
and that every developer is automatically eligible. For example,
when PSE&G decided to build a new headquarters facility around the
21
corner from its old ones, the site was declared blighted and eligible
for abatement under the Fox-Lance tax law. According to this law,
the develper pays either 15% of gross revenues or 2% of total project
costs annually in lieu of property taxes.28 The law designates the
2% option be used only when assessment of gross revenues would be
extraordinarily difficult. But in Newark, this alternative is ex-
tended to all developers. In the case of PSE&G, the firm pays only
a few hundred thousand dollars a year, instead of the approximately
$6 million it would be liable for if it had been assessed without
abatement (This assumes an assessed value of $60 million and the 1980
tax rate of $10.61 per $100.00 in assessed value).
The city, through Urban Development Action Grants (UDAG) admini-
stered by NEDC, will provide subordinated mortgages at low interest
29
rates. In 1979, NEDC distributed $11,545 million to the following
PROJECT NAME MORTGAGE (000) TERMS PROJECT COST (000)
One Washington Plaza $10,000 4%, 30 yrs. $30,000
Balco (Ironbound River Plaza) 1,000 3%, 15 yrs. 5,800
Alling Street Associates 439 3%, 20 yrs. 2,249
Felice-Murphy 107 3%, 15 yrs. 610
NEDC estimates that the additional annual revenues to the city will
exceed $1.5 million and that more than 1,100 new and permanent jobs
will be created. These grants, says the NEDC, "fulfill a desperately
needed financial catalyst creating a healthy economic development
environment". 3 0 What the spokesman neglects to point out is what kind
of jobs will be created. And, will these structures contain firms
new to the area, or are they simply a way for existing firms in
Newark to upgrade their facilities? One Washington Plaza, for example,
is expected to begin construction in June, 1981.31 Twelve of the
22
eighteen floors have been leased to the Bell Telephone Company, which
will simply move its existing Newark staff from one side of Broad
Street to the other. No new jobs there. The other floors have not
been leased, but it is rumored that the lobby will be leased by the
First National State Bank as a branch. Again, the job generation
process is not indicated. As for revenues, the NEDC states that the
developers will pay 50% of net profits in lieu of taxes.32 Tradition-
ally, the developer of a project earns about 6% on any project, and
many seek only to recapture their investment. Perhaps in Newark,
after the building reaches full occupancy, the situation will be
different.-
Although for the city the cost of selling Newark can be steep,
public financial assistance seems to be the only way to attract firms,
and to retain existing ones. As NEDC marketing director James Patterson
observed, "Newark must provide incentives just to be competitive".
Without the persuasive impact of a gross reduction in taxes, the city,
with its high taxes and negative image, is decidedly unattractive.
There is no such thing as a competitive edge in Newark; corporations
want estate-like settings for their plants, parks and other esthetic
amenities to accompany requisite transportation access, infrastructure,
and a skilled labor force. While Newark can provide the latter, it
loses on the "image" issue. The city, so the argument goes, has no
choice, but to provide drastic tax incentives.
From a public sector point of view, economic development in
Newark has come to mean public sector accomodation to private sector
wants. The 1978 Master Plan devotes fully half its text to a strategy
for economic development. According to the Plan, coordinated economic
23
development between public and private sectors, which focuses on the
established commercial and industrial sectors, is Newark's only route
to economic survival. Hence, the underlying theme of the recommend-
ations outlined in the Master Plan are ways in which the city will
accomodate the needs of the private sector. For example, the city is
willing to use its resources to acquire and write-down land, grant
generous abatements, modify the zoning code, and employ its financial
resources to leverage development activities. The city rationalizes
its behavior by linking economic development inextricably with local
goals. "The overriding thrust of the city's development effort",
reads the document, "is directed toward reducing unemployment, increas-
ing personal income, and generally improving the quality of life of
91 34its residents, while maintaining and improving the local tax base".
The private sector has lately made its own initiative in economic
development. Individual firms have constructed new facilities for
themselves or financ&dz new structures for other tenants. A handful of
major downtown firms has begun to investigate the possibility of col-
lectively rehabilitating and re-populating several srructures in the
Newark CBD.35 By far, however, the most heralded, if not most ambitious
plan is Renaissance Newark.
This chapter has summarized the economic, social, and political
situation in Newark. The city sustains a strong record as a manufac-
turing center for the northeastern New Jersey region. More recently,
however, the service sector has shifted to the lead role in the local
economy. The banks, insurance companies, legal, and brokerage firms
continue to grow within the central business district. Economic devel-
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opment, in any part of the city, is a relatively current trend. The
downtown has become the focus of increased business interest for
two primary reasons: 1) the rapid rise in office rents and energy
costs has made the area increasingly attractive to business; 2) a
private sector initiative to preserve the CBD has sparked the interest
and involvement of a majority of current downtown tenants.
The following chapter recounts the emergence of Renaissance
Newark, beginning with the informal meetings initiated during the first
term of Mayor Gibson in 1971. It reviews the actors and inputs that
precipitated the proposal for a renaissance program.
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Renaissance Newark is an idea that took several years to conceptualize.
It may take two or three years more to be implemented. It may be a few
years more before its impact is totally felt. Renaissance began in the
minds of some business executives situated in the commercial downtown
district. They observed the steady deterioration of the area; they watched
their security budgets climb to new heights. They were alarmed by the
swift decline of the area's appeal as a place in which to locate a business
or to work in.
A renaissance-type program was also an idea among development officers
in the city government. Always in search of ways to stabilize or increase
the tax base, these officials keyed in on potential opportunities in the
downtown. External circumstances had begun to come together in a manner
that made the city more attractive (e.g. lower rents for office space,
rising costs of energy and transportation) and coupled with existing tax
incentives, the city could build a strong case for itself.
The two critical years of planning for Renaissance are detailed
below. The process leading to the proposal is only the beginning, though.
Since Renaissance was announced, but before it achieved any of its goals,
the proposal has been the topic of much debate and speculation. The predom-
inant opinions, as well as some frequently heard predictions, conclude
the chapter.
When taken with the preceding chapter, this chapter creates a setting
in which Renaissance Newark will take place. These two chapters introduce
the actors, the resources, and begin to direct the reader toward the thought
processes which are the real issue of the research.
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PUBLIC/PRIVATE RELATIONSHIP BEFORE RENAISSANCE
In the announcement of the Renaissance Newark plan, Director John
Maddocks explained that the main thrust of Renaissance Newark, Inc.
"will be to coordinate the federal activities with those of state and
1
local agencies and the private sector". At the time of the inception
of Renaissance, the city was petitioning for federal and state funds for
improvements to the Penn STation and the Erie-Lackawanna train stations,
both heavily utilized by commuters to the city. According to Chamber of
Commerce sources, the deterioration of Penn Station -- where Amtrak,
Conrail, commuter bus and rail lines, and the PATH subway converge --
epitomizes the deteriorating conditions within the downtown. The facility
is encumbered by non-working escalators, a schedule board which works
only part-time, and repeated instances of mugging and robbery. The train
station has also become a winter haven for derelicts, drunks, and drug
2
addicts. It fosters a "sense of danger and unease" among the thousands
of workers who use the station each day. Hence, the first priority among
Renaissance Newark planners (specifically, the Mayor's office and the
Greater Newark Chamber of Commerce) was to insure that funds would be made
available for the station area improvement.
In 1979, the Federal Railroad Administration, a division of the
U.S. Department of Transportation, committed $20.3 million for the
"building and access upgrading". New Jersey Congressman James FLorio
3
announced in March 1981 that those funds would indeed be forthcoming.
The rehabilitation may take up to three years. It is expected to include
repair of the escalators and schedule board, cleaning and painting of
interiors and improved lighting inside and out.
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Concurrent with the application for DOT funds, city officials met
with the Council for Northeast Economic Action (CNEA) and the Coalition
of Northeastern Governors Policy Research Center (CONEG) to request that
they study the station area. The purpose of the study was to analyze
and promote the "linkage between the overall project and commercial
development in the vicinity of the individual stations along the
4
Northeast Corridor". The study concluded that infrastructure improvement
along the corridor could have a "direct and measurable impact on downtown
5
revitalization".
A number of business leaders situated in the downtown embraced the
study and used it to bring together major corporate heads, city adminis-
trators, the Governor's office, and representatives of the Northeast
Corridor Improvement Project, FRA, CONEG/CNEA, the Housing and Rehabili-
tation Authority (NHRA), and the state Departments of Environmental
Protection (NJDEP) and Transportation (NJDOT). Several meetings were held
in Newark during the summer of 1980. The meetings served to 1) provide
a focus for public-private planning; 2) point out the critical role for
station rehabilitation in the city's downtown revitalization; 3) lead
to a partnership between public and private sectors and the NJDOT"s
6
Office of Joint Economic Development and Urban Initiatives. This Office
would be the primary source of state funding for infrastructure improve-
ments. In 1980, the office allocated several million dollars for upgrading
the Erie-Lackawanna station in the north end of the business district
(the Newark stop for commuters from the city's western suburbs). The
rehabilitation program for the station began in January 1981 and includes
interior painting and replacement of brick facades and lighting fixtures.
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In 1979 and 1980, with a growing interest in commercial development,
several studies were executed to determine the needs and resources of
the downtown district. Both public andprivate sectors had either
commissioned,or performed themselves, studies assessing the potential
of the area. The NRHA study of the Passaic River waterfront just east
of the CBD concluded that the vacant land might support one or two retail
areas (one to be a building-to-market conversion like Fanueil Hall in
8
Boston), renovated housing, and an "urban park system". The Urban
9
Development Plan , wirtten by the Mayor's Policy and Development Office
(MPDO), detailed neighborhood by neighborhood development objectives.
For the CBD, the Mayor's office wants to promote more parking space and
improved commuter facilities, and the development of more greenspace to
accompany the increase in new and rehabilitated office space. At the
same time, the Economic development task force of the Greater Newark
Chamber of Commerce (GNCC) had completed its own study. In the spring
of 1980, these studies were compiled and examined by the downtown business
community. Some of their conclusions about downtown development were:
a) the underdeveloped land in and near the CBD has an intrinsic
appeal if certain conditions can be met;
b) modernized, safe Penn Station is critical to the success of
the redevelopment plans for the area;
c) there is now a very,very high level of interest in spurring
redevelopment at all levels of government and in Newark's
aggressive private business community;
d) continued piecemeal development of the CBD will not make the
most effective use of federal and state urban development and
transportation assistance programs;
e) federal assistance programs can be used to establish a local 10
development entity to supervise development in the station area.
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This last conclusion became the starting point toward the concept-
ualization of Renaissance Newark. As had been the practice since the
beginning of the Gibson tenure, the Mayor met frequently with top manage-
ment of the largest Newark firms and executives of the GNCC to discuss
future plans for Newark. Described as informal gatherings during which
11
each participant became familiar "with each others aspirations" for
Newark, the meetings were in fact a prime opportunity for strategic planning
and action. Representatives from the public and private sectors negotiated
the city's future at these sessions. Business executives from the financial
institutions made their intentions and desires known, while the Mayor
listened to determine to what degree the city could be accomodating.
At one meeting between Mayor Gibson and then president of the GNCC, David
Rinsky, the two came up with a plan to establish a special district for
concentrated development in the downtown. They constituted an ad hoc
committee to outline a corporation that would oversee downtown development.
The ad hoc committee consisted of a major decision-maker from the
GNCC, NEDC, NRRA, and NJDOT. The organization they shaped became known
as Renaissance Newark, Inc.
The Renaissance Newark Organization
Renaissance Newark operated out of offices leased by Public Service
Electric and Gasc Company (PSE&G). The director is a loaned executive
from PSE&G who spent 19 years in economic development at the utility.
The eight member Board of Directors includes the chtsf executive officer
of five major coppopations: the First National Bank of New Jersey,
Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company, The Prudential Insurance Company
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of America, PSE&G, and the United States SAvings Bank. The other members
are the Mayor, the State Commissioner of Tkansportation, and the current
president of the GNCC. Funding for first year operations, $260,000
so far, was contributed by the 14 largest Newark firms. The focus of
Renaissance, according to Director Maddocks, is limited to the downtown
12
because that "is where the potential exists" . Maddocks views Renaissance
as a "catalyst, at least for revitalization in the downtown". He assured
the author that the "big firms downtown" are working to create job
13
opportunities and an improved tax basis for the city. Maddocks
summarized the objectives as threefold:
1. a role for the private sector in revitalizing Newark.
2. to protect and enhance the investments of the large firms downtown.
14
3. to enhance the quality of life for people in Newark.
Perhaps not suprisingly, there are at least as many opinions about
Renaissance Newark as there are participating firms and government agencies.
In fact, even though both public and private sectors are represented on
the Board of Directors, there is disagreement over the role and function
of the Renaissance Newark.
Participating business firms anticipate the role of Renaissance to
be that of planner and coordinator. Renaissance Newakk will draw together
the firm with the financer, with the public sector provider of funding
and infrastructure. Theoretically, at least, the public and private
sector actors will combine their resources to effect local development.
The activities of individual firms will be coordinated with the transpor-
tation improvements already taking place. Each piece of development
will complement the others, so that the result is coordinated area-wide
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development throughout the downtown.
A secondary consequence of successful downtown development will be
the realization of benefits beyond the central business district.
Rjnaissance director Maddocks explains that business community participants
feel confident that Renaissance projects will help expand the tax base
and increase the number of jobs in the city. It is not yet known to
what degree the tax base or revenues will be increased, nor
what type of jobs will become available. The general opinion among
business leaders, according to James Patterson at NEDC, is that new,
first-class commercial office space, at a leasing price of $15 - $22
per square foot, will appeal to the New York City firms who now pay two
15
to three times that rate for office space. Moreover, new facilities
in the city, it is believed, will appeal to suburban firms whose costs
are rising with increased cost of fuel and theneed for automobile transportation
to their locations. The Board of Directors of Renaissance Newark has said
that the corporation will approach financial, legal, and brokerage
institutions similar to those already present in downtown Newark. No doubt,
occupancy by these types will represent and increase in white collar job
opportunities.
Within the business community, there is apparent high regard for
Renaissance efforts. Corporations heads, as well as the chairman of the
GNCC, speak optimistically about the changes that may be wrought.
The GNCC, as the organizad body representing the business community, is
well aware of the needs and opportunities present in the business district.
They also know well the requirements for maintaining a business community
and for attracting new members to it. Nearly all these concerns have
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have been incorporated into the Renaissance proposal. For example,
they have asserted that transportation improvements are the most critical
element of any Renaissance Newark accomplishments. In fact, the trans-
portation upgrading can be considered the kingpin and foundation from which
all development will grow. Beyond that, these firms want access to any
financial assistance offered by the government at every level. Therefore,
the city's ability to win grants, to assign abatement rights, and to
grant tax incentives are another crucial factor to the realization of
Renaissance goals. It becomes apparent as one reviews the proposal that
the business community knew exactly what they want, and who will play
which role in order to attain it.
Government officials like RonaldJean at MPDO view Renaissance Newark
activities as an extension of "private sector leadership" traditional to
16
the city. He notes that there is a "greater need now more than ever
17
to let the private sector take more of a leadership position". In an
interview he explaineded that city government is limited in its financial
and physical capacity to effect change in the downtown. As Jean sees,it,
priorities and accomplishments are determined by those who hold the
18
"purse strings'. While the Mayor or planning department may set goals,
they can only do as much as the purse -- or purse string holder --
will allow. He cited as an example the shifting priorities within the
department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). If HUD decides that
a greater proportion of its funds should be used to finance new construction
for the elderly, the cities must oblige, even if a given city's priority
is moderate rehabilitation. It is the same situation in Newark, according
to Jean. The large corporations hold the strings. Economic development
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may not be the chief priority around city hall; it may be housing or
quality education. But those with significant financial resources want
to promote economic development. And that, says Jean, is the way downtown
development became the pre-eminent concern of the Newark revitalization
agenda.
The Newark Economic Development Corporation (NEDC) is a non-profit,
quasi-governmental organization established by public and private sector
officials to be the city's agent for economic development. Among
the services the organization provides are technical assistance, guide
through the bureaucratic system, site and facility location advice, and
financial assistance. NEDC negotiates on behalf of firms for tax abatement
privileges and manages UDAG received by the city. The staff of NEDC
21
perceives itself as a group of businessmen. Having been for the last
seven years the premier economic development agency, NEDC interpreted
the Renaissance proposal differently from its architects.
NEDC staff regard Renaissance as a complementary activity to their
own operation. They expect the two organizations will work well together,
but in no way will Renaissance supercede NEDC's efforts. Marketing
22
Director James Patterson emphasized the differences between the two:
Renaissance Newark has targeted commercial development while NEDC focuses
on both industrial and commercial areas. Renaissance is a "small body
with a small audience", but'NEDC operates on a comprehensive, city-wide
basis. Renaissance represents not much more than a marketing effort by
highly influential, high visibility local firms. The groundwork and
the detail work, Patterson assures us, will remain the territory of
the NEDC.
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All indications so far suggest that Renaissance Newark will be welcomed
by the officials of Newark. Administrators throughout city hall readily
acknowledge their inability to produce the economic impacts necessary
to sustain the downtown district. They appear to have already accepted
a back seat role to the leadership of the private sector. While the
business community develops strategy and implements plans, local government
will await their cue and then will do what is asked. In the meantime,
local officials continue to struggle with increasing budget deficit, the
need for a long-overdue reassessment of real property and the diminishing-
quality of municipal services delivery.
Yet, even while the public sector endorses the Renaissance plan,
officials are not yet able to articulate what they expcet the Renaissance
will deliver. All tend to agree that the ties between economic development
in the CBD and general upgrading are very close. But there is less of a
consensus on the precise nature and timing of those benefits.
Apparently, there are a number of views on the function of Renaissance
Newark. In the opinion of the Chamber of Commerce, which reflects the
feelings in general of the businesses in the downtown, Renaissance Newark
can help generate jobs and expand the tax base. Public officials, like
the director of the Mayor's Policy and Development Office, endorse
private sector initiative as the viable alternative when public resources
are severely limited. From public and private sectors, support has been
expressed for the Renaissance concept and program.
It seems that endorsements are forthcoming because the person prof-
fering his/her support maintains a positive vision with regard to what
Renaissance Newark will accomplish. That official or business person
"sees" the success of Renaissance not only in the business district, but
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throughout the city as well. ALthough Renaissance is indeed narrowly
focussed on the central business district, the participating officials
who were interviewed conveyed the assurance that the entire city would
benefit.
PREDICTIONS ABOUT RENAISSANCE NEWARK
There are several prominent predictions about Renaissance Newark,
including (but not limited to):
1. the filter down effect
2. the expanded city coffers effect
3. the confidence factor
The filter down effect is a p-opular response among private business persons
and development officials in the quasi-public agencies such as NEDC and
Renaissance itself. These people represent vested interests located in the
CBD, and so are concerned primarily, if not exclusively, with the preser-
vation of that area. They have not prepared a direct attack on the:. problems
that prevail in the rest of the city. Hence, when questioned about what
Renaissance will accomplish for Newark outside the CBD, they respond with
notions of a long-term impact, whereby success in the downtown will
encourage other business activity, create demand and increase job oppor-
tunities. Eventually, the bounty of the downtown district will expand
beyond the boundaries of the commercial center.
The effect is based on the economic assumption that when the business
sector thrives, when productivity and profits are high, the propensity
for business to grow and involve a larger community in its prosperity
increases. In the case of Newark, success in the downtown will mean firms
committing to remain in the city, some expansion, and the ability to
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attract new firms to the area. This activity will lead to more jobs
(presumably for local residents), more revenues to the city, and hence
more monies circulating through the local economy. The commercial success
and the availability of consumer monies will in turn attract retail
organizations and service sector operations. Furthermore, with more
opportunities to be found in the city, more people will want to work,
shop, and live in Newark. Hence, the return of the middle class. Each
aspect will reinforce the others. The important point to realize is
that economic development in one select area must come first. With all
energies and resources channeled here, making the CBD goals primary, they
will be realized. By recognizing that business district goals come first,
and are the most significant, the first step toward total city revital-
ization will occur.
The "expanded city coffers" reasoning is most popular among public
officials, especially when asked how Renaissance achievements will benefit
the indigenous poor. This rationale begins with the caveat: "economic
development is not our first priority. Housing, or safe streets or
(you fill in the balnk) is. But..." Following the "but" is an explan-
ation of the city's financial crisis. The city has only one source of
revenues, taxation, and relies heavily on various forms of outside urban
aid. The size of the dependency on outside assistance is tremendous, and
currently in jeopardy due to the goals of the conservative administration
ensconced in Washington,. Without these sources the city will be unable
to provide even the essential services. Maintaining these sources, there-
fore, is the uppermost goal. And any actions that would increase city
revenues is desirable. With more monies available, as Renaissance
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promises to generate, the city can direct the funds where they are most
needed and utilize them to remedy the problems plaguing the city.
The emphasis, therefore, should not be on how or from whom the city
obtains its funds, but on how those funds are put to use. According
to this rationalization, the sizeable gains associated with Renaissance
Newark's success will create meaningful increases in the city's supply of
funds, and then, in their ability to serve the residents of Newark.
Related to both the filter down theory and the expanded city coffers
theory is the notion that what the city really needs, and what Renaissance
will provide, is confidence in the city. When current residents and,
more important, non-resident businesses and individuals see the restor-
ation of Newark, they will begin to believe in the city. With confidence
will come other businesses, different residents, more positive attention,
and eventually a boost to the economy. If commercial space developers
can achieve success and relative security downtown, then perhaps residential
builders will as well. If firms can be convinced to settle in the city,
then individuals may be persuaded to work and live there, too. The critical
movement is to change the image and the impressions evoked by the city.
When observers can be assured of the vaibility and vitality of Newark, their
behavior toward the city will change, and the city ultimately will benefit.
The purpose, therefore, of Renaissance is to market the city, to sell its
good points and alter its image to one of attractiveness. Renaissance will
be charged with not only generating interest, but also with creating
physical evidence that the city is "new and improved". When a perspective
tenant has been convinced of these things, he will be more likely to
settle in the city. From that point on, either a filtering down or an
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increase in city revenues will translate into the opportunity to better
provide services for the residents of Newark.
The objective of Renaissance Newark is to promote and achieve new
and/or rehabilitated commercial development within the business district.
Government officials, corporate leaders, heads of quasi-governmental
agencies all seem to agree that Renaissance can bring about change in
Newark -- if it can first cause change within the CBD. And apparently,
there is confidence that Renaissance will work in the business district.
As for its accomplishments outside that area, there is still room for
speculation and doubt.
The public sector seemingly has put its trust in the Mayor, who is
the only public sector representative on the Renaissance Board of Directors,
and in the integrity of those who would manage and finance Renaissance
Newark's operations. Needless to say, it takes a good deal of faith to
believe that a program not yet proven in its targeted area will produce
reforms thourghout the city. But perhaps faith is the key element in
the public sector's involvement in Renaissance Newark. For the public
sector has little to offer, less to gain (in the short run at least), but
much to lose if the program fails. Because for all that the city may be
in the daytime, it is much less -- and much worse -- at night. When the
tall buildings close and the commuters flee, Newark has only itself:
rampant crime, gross poverty, and all the hopelessness connoted by the word
"slums". Since Newark in and of itself possesses so little and almost none
of the resources necessary to rehabilitate itself, any project promising
relief can look good. It is evident in those who migrate from the city,
in the despair of those who remain, and even, some say, in the Mayor's
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attitude, that there is no hope for Newark.
. So why does the private sector feel differently? What does that
sector know, either about itself or about NEwark, that would cause it to
invest sufficient resources to revitalize any part of the city? When
Renaissance Newark was proposed, and as its planning capacity has
unfolded, certain critical assumptions about Newark and the revitalization
program have emerged. The assumptions reveal a) what may be true if
Renaissance Newark is to succeed; and/or b) what must be true if Renaissance
is to benefit the rest of the city. These assumptions help to define
Renaissance by defining the setting, actors, and inputs that Renaissance
Newark will utilize. For example, the predictions about Renaissance's
impact find their basis in this set of assumptions. The predictions are
part what will happen, and part what the prognosticator wants to happen.
But both parts are predicated upon what one believes to be true about
Newark.
If downtown development can be thought of as a building, then these
assumptions are its four walls. With one or two in place, the potential
for a building becomes apparent. If all four walls are present, there is
certainty that the structure will come into being. But, if there are no
walls, no assumptions, or if they are so flawed with inaccuracies as to
be unbelievable, then there can be no building.
And so its is with Newark. WHen the Mayor and his staff and the
business people met to formulate the REnaissance plan, they brought with
them specific beliefs. Then they structured Renaissance Newark around
and in accordance with those beliefs. What the Renaissance Newark
participants apparently believe about the city is revealed in the assumptions
stated below. Although there may be a number of working assumptions, the
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four selected seem to recur in written documents, in official statements,
newspaper accounts and person interviews. As chapter 4 illustrates,
regardless of whether the speaker was a government official in city hall,
or a business executive in a Broad Street office, the outlook was the same.
Thus in order for Renaissance Newark to achieve its objectives, first in
the CBD and eventually throughout Newark, these assumptions must prove to
be true. As I perceive them, the assumptions state that:
1. An increase in job opportunities in the city via Renaissance
efforts will mean an increase in jobs for Newark residents.
2. Benefits of downtown redevelopment will filter down and out to
the rest of the city.
3. Financial assistance is forthcoming from all level of government.
4. Tax abatement is necessary to make Newark "regionally competitive".
For the author, there is a sense that behind these assumptions there
is another, ultimate idea about Newark. It has to do with the intangible
aspects of redevelopment: the attitudinal or philosophical changes that
are also needed to revitalize the city. It may be a simple notion about
"image" or "confidence" or the feeling elicited when the name !Newark"
is spoken.
In the section to follow, these assumptions are examined. Their
source(s) -is explained, and their mutual and individual characteristics
are defined. Their accuracy and the significance of their inaccuracy is
discussed in the latter half of the chapter. So far, the paper has
attempted to portray the setting in which the events of Renaissance will
unfold. For the rest of the paper, the narrative will explore motivations
and purposes and will speculate on outcomes.
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"Execs and officials launch big effort to revive Newark"
"Chamber aims to revitalize Newark"
"Newark envisions Penn Station as hub for commercial complex"
These are the banner headlines that herald the coming of the
Newark Renaissance. The city for decades has suffered a comprehensive
decline: in housing; in employment opportunities and income; in municipal
revenues and delivery of public services. Here at last is a change, in the
form of Renaissance Newark. Staff and supporters of the non-profit organ-
ization maintain lofty expectations for the program's accomplishments.
Part of their optimism can be explained by their view of the city
itself.' The public officials and business leaders who crafted the Renais-
sance proposal seem to have based their intervention on a vision of what
the city's positive attributes are, where they can be found, and how they
can be exploited for the benefit of the city. These officials also have
opinions -- backed, if not by fact, then certainly by enthusiasm -- about
how much they can accomplish.
This section is an examination of several of the prime assumptions
held by the creators of Renaissance Newark. From their own statements and
official accounts, the author infers what views of Newark and its problems
most likely lay behind the planning of Renaissance Newark. These assumptions
are contrasted to evidence about existing conditions. The purpose of the
comparison is to enable the author to evaluate the accuracy of the assumptions
and further, to speculate on possible implications for Renaissance and the
city of Newark. The discussion of those implications is the topic of
the final chapter of this paper.
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ASSUMPTION #1: An increase in job opportunities in the city via
Renaissance efforts will mean an increase in jobs
for Newark residents.
In his inaugural address, former chairman of the Greater Newark Chamber
of Commerce Robert Eberle asserted that "the single key to meeting the
interrelationship among Newark's major problems is economic. It alone
can produce new jobs required to reduce unemployment, elevate income stan-
dards, sustain housing andeducational improvement and raise the tax base
sufficiently".1 Eight years later, on a similar occasion, Richard Schoon,
current president of the GNCC, iterated asimilar theme. "The fundamental
problem in American cities", he declared, "is the declining job base.
It created a whole series of other problems -- lack of interest in the
community for the jobless, too much leisure, crime -- it gives people a
sense of insecurity. The.retention and creation of jobs is the top priority
for revitalization efforts in Newark". 2
Statements like evince the commitment on the part of the business
community to turn Newark around. Leaders in both private and public sectors
recognize the need to provide jobs as a critical element of revitalizing
the city. In fact, one of the three major goals of the city's economic
development strategy is the creation of "improved resident economic oppor-
tunities" (meaning the opportunity to own as well as work in a firm).3
Among the specific objectives which feed into these goals are to increase the
total jobs for the resident labor force; and to increase resident job skills/
income generation capability. Here, then, is a convergence of public
and private interests. Agreement on the importance of job creation can be
a first step toward a major cooperative effort between the two sectors.
The Renaissance Board of Directors focusses on the downtown district
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for development. The rehabilitation and construction of office space, the
renovation of transportation networks, and improvements of infrastructure
are all targeted goals. These changes ideally will attract investors
and employers who will settle in and then create jobs. What might these
job opportunities be? First, there is the possibility of expansion of
existing firms in the area. The CBD in Newark is primarily a financial
district: insurance and banking institutions, legal and brokerage firms
and a few retail establishments. The type of jobs found here tend to
be professional, technical and office operatives. Any expansion of these
firms would probably mean more of the same type jobs. Second, the
downtown activity may attract new firms (that is, new to the area).
According to one redevelopment specialist, the targeted firms are "back
office operations from Wall Street" (the financial district of New York
City), brokerage houses, banking, etc. and perhaps-a branch office of the
firm. Here again, are firms who employ chiefly highly-skilled technical
people in support staff roles, and professional-managerial types in
executive roles. And any jobs generated through the introduction of
these firms to the area would be similar positions.
The first Renaissance Newark project, One Washington Plaza, will
5
evenutally house about 1500 employees. The Bell Telephone Company,
which has leased 70% of the office space, will place some 1300 of its
administrative, engineering, and clerical staff there. It is expected
that other tenants will "ultimately generate" 665 permanent new jobs,
including more than 300 for low and moderate income persons. Although
presently there no commitments for the rest of the building, the Mutual
Benefit Life Insurance Company (which holds the primary mortgage) is
confident that total occupancy will be reached within six years.
44
These are the opportunities being created in downtown Newark: jobs
utilizing sophisticated office equipment, jobs requiring specialized
training in business or management, or in subjects such as accounting,
economics and finance. To a lesser degree there will be jobs in construc-
tion and in the support services. Newark residents should be encouraged
by the presence of new job openings, especially those that are within
easy access of their homes. Newark residents, if they are prepared with
the necessary skills and competencies, can benefit from the downtown
Renaissance almost as much as the firms themselves.
Comment on Assumption #1
To say- that the resident labor force in Newark can support a white
collar demand is to misstate the facts and to ignore the obvious. More-
over, to imply that an increase in job opportunities for the city will
mean an increase in jobs for residents is to be unaware of the employment
history of Newark residents in that city.
Yet these are the views implicit in the Renaissance proposal and in
statements made by public and private sector officials in relation to
the proposal. As explained in the previous section, these officials
proclaim their personal and/or their firms' commitment to Newark and
belief that the city's rebirth is "just around the corner". These
officials, who would never say they believe only in their particular
block, or in just the CBD, nonetheless concentrate their efforts
exclusively in the business district downtown.
Therein lies the problem, for the majority of Newark residents do
not work in the city. Among those who do, a large proportion are
employed in manufacturing and industrial firms. In 1977, there were
138,292 Newark residents employed in Newark in civilian (non-government)
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positions. Fifty per cent of those workers held blue collar jobs; only
one-third held white collar positions. Newarkers found jobs in four major
industries: manufacturing; services; finance, insurance, and real estate;
and retail trade. The distribution of jobs to those categories in 1979
6
was:
Number Per cent
Industry Employed Employed
Manufacturing 41,742 31.2%
Services 26,343 19.7
Finance, Real Estate, Insur. 16,582 12.4
Retail Trade 15,929 11.9
TOTAL 100,596 75.0%
The remaining 25% of jobs were scattered in wholesale trade, communications
and utilities, construction, mining, agricultural and other industries.
Although there were no corresponding figures citing in which firms city
residents work, major employers in the downtown (e.g. PSE&G, Bell Telephone,
the Prudential) have estimated that more than 90% of their employees are
non-residents.
This estimate is supported further by statistics on where local
residents work. Less than half work within the city. Some 23% work in
other parts of Essex County or in adjacent Union County. Roughly 5%
work in Manhattan, while the rest are scattered throughout the other four
boroughs of New York City and nearby counties in New Jersey.
A significant number of residents are neither working nor prepared
to work. Of the total population over age 25, only a third have high
school diplomas. Less than 5% are college graduates. Non-completion of
high school is a serious problem; the deteriorating quality of schools
is a contributing factor. Of the population between the ages of 16 and 21,
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53% are not enrolled in school: slightly less than half have completed
high school, while the rest, about 10,170, are drop-outs. Consequently,
the unemployment rate for these two sub-groups is phenomenal. 36.3% of
the high school graduates and 61.8% of the drop-outs are unemployed or
not in the labor force.7
City-wide, the unemployment rate is estimated to be 11.7%, though
because of counting errors the figure fluctuates between 10% and 20%.
Between 1970 and 1977, the number of businesses declined from 7575 to
5733, a drop of 24%. During the same period, the unemployment rate rose
from 6.5% to 15.9%. The total number of jobs lost in that period was
46,145, or one-fourth the number present in 1970.
State officials predict that most job opportunities will exist in
non-manufacturing industries which account for 7 out of 10 non-agricul-
tural jobs in the area. Opportunities are expected to include professional
and non-professional positions. Specific positions predicted to be in
high demand include computer programmer, clerical, auto mechanic, and
machinist. Other opportunities, say state labor officials, are dependent
upon the realization of redevelopment plans in the downtown and elsewhere,
especially the industrial meadowlands and at Newark International Airport.
In view of the statistics summarized above, it is clear that most
residents are not working in the city. Many more are not working at all.
The drop out rate is high. Those who do graduate from high school are
ill-equipped to succeed in college.8 Even those who attend vocational
programs are being taught useless skills on equipment that rapidly becomes
obsolete in the office environment. It is apparent that Newark workers
are not prepared to assume white collar positions. In addition, there is
still a question as to exactly how many jobs will become available,
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regardless of cause. There is no indication that local residents have
filled white collar positions in the past, nor that they will be more
likely to do so in the future.
ASSUMPTION #2: Benefits of downtown redevelopment will filter down
and out to the rest of the city.
For more than 30 years, Newark has been involved in urban renewal programs.
The city has traditionally emphasized neighborhood revitalization, e.g.
the provision of quality housing, modern schools and open spaces. Only
in the last five or six years has urban renewal turned to downtown
redevelopment. A number of factors have recently come together to make
downtown revitalization an important opportunity for the city. Large
firms such as Mutual Benefit and the Prudential Life insurance companies
have invested in real property downtown. Other major employers like
Public Service Electric and Gas and the Bell Telephone Company have built
headquarters in Newark. Smaller firms too have made a commitment to
remain. In the face of rising rental and transportation costs, the
attractions of Newark increase noticeably.
Renaissance Newark, thus, is nearly an inevitable occurrence. In just
a couple of years, a strong interest in the downtown has manifest itself,
coupled with the necessary financial support from public and private
sectors. After some preliminary studies andplanning for the organization's
structure and purpose, the objectives of Renaissance Newark, Inc. were
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identified as follows:
*Additional parking facilities for commuters and office space
occupants;
*Construction of new office space in conjunction with trans-
portation, retail and commercial development in the area;
*Planning and development of open space and parks along the
riverfront;
*Consideration of housing development along with upgrading of 1
Rte. 21 and creation of a logical, integrated parking plan.
These objectives can easily be seen as beneficial to both commuters and
local residents. Infact, the open space and housing development goals
may provide benefits for local residents directly. They are not jobs,
of course, but residents nevertheless are in need of parks and housing.
Unfortunately, oneg Renaissance priorities were established and action
initiated, only the needs directly related to the CBD were acted on.
For example, the One Washington Plaza, new office building, is the first
step in the Renaissance program. This structure, situated in the north
end of the business district, is partially finance by a $10 million
UDAG-backed mortgage, and was granted tax abatement. In addition, the
contiguous area will receive increased infrastructure improvements and
police protection (requested by the GNCC). One tenant will lease 70% of
the office space. But no new jobs will be created because that tenant
is simply moving across the street. And with tax abatement granted, the
city will have to wait at least 15 years to obtain full taxation on the
property. This more or less, is the Renaissance Newark model: construc-
tion of new office space complemented by government financing and infra-
structure improvements, leads to the retention and creation of jobs. One
project is not necessarily connectehoanother except that all occur within
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the central business district.
There is no indication how or when the housing and open space objec-
tives will be addressed. But clearly, top priority is placed in the
construction of office space in the downtown. The Renaissance program
seems to be based on demand, hence the commercial development activity --
an outgrowth of the demand for "first class" office space in that labor
area. If this relationship persists, housing will have to wait until
there is a similar demand for it. (This may already be a notion in the
back of someone's mind. Janice Newman, in the Mayor's Office, for instance,
believes the interest and opportunities in Newark will attract potential
residents.).
Demand may be the catalyst in the Renaissance program, but there are
two other entities concerned with development in the city, and each has
its own approach. The city is a recipient of Community Development Block
Grant funds. According to the fifth funding year report (1980), 20% of
the funds went to the provision of social services, e.g. health centers,
day care, etc. More than 40% was spent on urban renewal activities:
clearance, close-out, and completion. Although the CD agenda is primarily
concerned with housing and community services, it does address economic
development. While housing andpublic services are directed toward all the
city's districts, economic development objectives focus exclusively on the
downtown. Among the objectives are the stabilization of the existing
economic base and expansion and improvement of those public services that
affect Newark firms. About 15% of the CD budget is allocated for these
purposes.
The CD agenda effectively complements the recently written Master
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Plan. The plan provides an overview of needs and opportunities throughout
the city, but its emphasis is plainly on economic development. More than
half the text is devoted to economic development goals and strategies.
The rest of the plan seems a prologue. Even though the plan does not
provide a step-by-step guide to revitalization, it does diagnose the city's
problems and most urgent needs. It further commits the city to action
that supports the Newark business community -- securing financing, infra-
structure upgrading, provision of increased public services where and when
requested -- without stating what the city will gain from the firm in
return.
Both the Master Plan and the CDBG program fit well with the intentions
of Renaissance Newark and they share a commitment to the city and specific
goals for the CBD. The apparent link between the two is an assumption
that actions need not be directed at all parts of the city in order for
all sections to benefit. Since no existing document provides instructions
for directly addressing specific community needs, nor suggests a way for
the "two Newarks", the one within the CBD and the one without, to be
integrated, one can only conclude that benefits to the city will be eventual
and indirect.
Comments on Assumption #2
There is a tendency among Newark development officials to assume
that the benefits of Renaissance Newark -- that is to say, the benefits
of downtown redevelopment -- will filter down to Newark residents. There
are no plans directed expressly at other neighborhoods in the city, or at
the needs of the indigenous population. One can infer from a variety of
sources such as the Renaissance proposal, the Master Plan and the Community
Development Block Grant report, that the first (sole?) priority in the
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redevelopment plan is the downtown district. That development success in
the downtown is the "key" to the total revitalization of Newark has been
expressed by the Mayor, his staff, Mr. Buck of NRHA, Mr. Faiella of NEDC,
Mr. Schoon of the GNCC, and a number of other corporate and governmental
officials. Few will argue that economic development, capital investment
etc. are not important for the survival of an urban center. The issue is
whether the economic development in the CBD should hold such singular
importance in a city consumed by broader problems.
The idea of a benefit "trickling down" from an intervention implies
a long term payout. First, there must be a project, or ideally a series
of projects. that can generate the benefits (jobs, revenues, improved
image, etc.). The impact of the project manifests itself slowly. The firm
pays property taxes, but a sizeable amount must be collected before the
city can alter its expenditure policy. One firm can with time generate a
few jobs, but benefits cannot be said to have trickled down until a number
of job opportunities have reached the local population. In other words,
one firm comes to the area, must be successful enough to both generate
jobs and revenues and attract other firms who will duplicate the first
firm's efforts. Only after these firms have permeated the local economy
will their influence be felt. But if we were to imagine a scenario, based
on activities that have occurred in Newark, the result might resemble this:
Three firms move to Newark and are quartered in a newly constructed
office building. The firms, all of which have moved from New York City,
bring nearly their entire staffs, thus creating less than a dozen job
openings. The building was constructed with long-term financing via UDAG,
and received a 15 year tax abatement. The city also provided a parking
garage and additional police protection during rush hours. In little
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more than five years, the building reaches 100% occupancy. The flow of
benefits begins slowly: one Newark resident is hired by a firm. Most
of the unfilled positions require college degrees, or persons with special
training on word processors or computers. The benefit of the new building
as a source of property taxes is cancelled out by the increased demand
for municipal services. At the end of 15 years, the city can collect the
full liability from the building; there is no guarantee, however, that
the building willleconomically viable then. The term of the UDAG mortgage
iS 30 years, but this stream of amortization is insufficient to support
further investment.
As a symbolic endorsement of the city, a second office tower is erected.
A Newark firm moves in, but the company simply wanted to upgrade its
facilities in Newark. After moving to the new quarters, the firm abandons
the current site, which is placed on the city's real property rolls.
This scenario has only been played out in pieces so far, but it is a
composite of authentic actions and outcomes. Some UDAG funds were applied
to the PSE&G building, and provide the second mortgage for One Washington
Plaza and the Ironbound River Plaza. The city parking authority financed
the construction of the Military Park parking lot and the Erie-Lackawanna
station lot. The length of time until total occupancy is reached can range
from eight years, as with Gateway I, down to less than one month, which
was the case with the PSE&G headquarters. With a few more details, this
model might serve as a sort of prediction of the likely impacts of Renais-
sance Newark on the city. At this time, however, there are no prediction
models save the predictions of those participating in the program itself.
Benefits may indeed filter down; there is simply no empirical evidence
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that such an occurrence is likely in Newark.
Benefits may filter down from one section of a city to another, but
why should they have to? And for howlong must the city wait to realize
those benefits? The director of MPDO has already acknowledged that Newark
cannot wait for the long run remedy.2 All of Newark needs help now.
Isn't it possible to formulate a comprehensive, albeit staggered, redevel-
opment program for the city?
For example, one explanation of the Renaissance given by a Prudential
executive, is that it will leverage one project from another. The train
station renovation leads to the Prudential's Gateway III. The Gateway
encourages the Kresge building renovation. The Kresge building stimulates
activities along Broad Street, etc. The probelm is that with this format,
the renewal projects are confided to the area of the business district.
Any impacts outside that area should probably be labelled spillover effects,
and will depend more on the change in overall image of the downtown than
any directly-linked antecedent.
An alternative to the project-by-project model is a city wide one.
This plan might mean investing in cottage industries in the East ward.
Sk.ill training centers could be opened in the Central and East wards which
would feed employees into the East ward factories and the central business
district offices. Let neighborhood self-help groups renovate housing in
the North ward and Weequahic ward, where much of the remaining stock is
still viable. Draw attention to each ward's "potential" for job creation,
housing, social services or job training and a labor force. In this way,
the downtown becomes "one of" the successful districts, instead of the
only one. The process may be gradual, and the benefits achieved over the
long run, but every neighborhood has the opportunity to participates and
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all residents can be actors instead of passive recipients.
ASSUMPTION #3: Financial aid is forthcoming from all levels
of government.
In almost every recorded discussion of downtown development, the importance
of financial aid from all levels of government was stressed. Milton Buck,
executive director of the Newark Housing and Rehabilitation Authority,
stated that certain "key pieces" must fall into place before there can be
any commercial development.1 Among these items are:
Congressional approval of funding for a $21.1 million restoration
of Penn Station as part of the federal Northeast Corridor Improvement
Project;
Agreement by the Federal Railroad Administration, to share the
costs of a major parking garage in the.tract serving both Penn
Station andthe projected commercial development;
A decision by the State Department of Transportation on a plan
to widen and improve Rte. 21 which separates Penn Station from
the development site;
So far, the only funds delivered yet are for the Penn Station project.
But Buck is neither the first nor the only official to underscore
the pivotal role of transportation aid. The GNCC has described the condition
of Penn Station as symbolic of the decline of the downtown area. The
Renaissance Newark announcement states that "creative financing, using
private and public sources, would be devised, and the entire project would
be coordinated with transportation planning and improvements". 2 Various
business leaders, including GNCC presidents, and heads of Mutual Benefit
and PSE&G have reiterated the opinion that without transportation aid,
downtown development won't happen.
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Transportation aid, however, is not the only type of support
solicited. The city has become a heavy user of UDAG funds, tax abalte-
ment, and state bond financing. The city has won 11 UDAG grants within
the last ten years, and has used them to leverage office buildings in
the downtown, factories in the industrial meadowlands, and an occ sional
hotel/restaurant complex. The Ideal Toy manufacturing company, the
Alling Streets associates building, and One Washington Plaza have all
benefitted from UDAG funding. The PSE&G building, the Blue Cross/
Blue Shield headquarters, and the first Gateway complexes were awarded
tax abatement. State bond financing has supported renovations in
municipal facilities and the conversion of a former office building
into housing for the elderly. In fact, every commercial property
constructed in the last 10 years has been the recipient of tax abatement;
half also were financed in part by UDAG monies.
Sometimes, non-financial aid is what is sought. What this means
is that Renaissance Newark seeks an endorsement, or a "promise to use"
from the government, instead of, or along with financial assistance.
For instance, Renaissance Newark plans to participate in the planning
and development of parks and open spaces. They base their participa-
tion on "growing Federal and state interest in riverfront development".
This interest, say Renaissance officials, could be translated into
development funds. Once again, private sector participation must be
precipitated by public sector interest and financing.
A second example of pursuit of non-financial aid can befound in
the proposal for rehabilitation of the Kresge building in the center of
the downtown district. A "key element", according to sponsors of the
project, is a commitment by the state to lease the rehabbed floors
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for its 2,000 employees in Newark. It happens that the state is indeed
searching for new first class space for its Newark employees, and has
said that it will not renew the lease at its current location in the
city. But no final commitment has been made. Local officials and business
leaders subsequently have applied pressure at the governor's office
for the rehabbed building.
In effect, the Renaissance creators regard government aid as an
immutable given; it will always be there. When business leaders
and development officials met, studied and planned the redevelopment
of downtown, they moved on the assumption that Federal aid would be
available. Nearly every major corporate and GNCC official has empha-
sized the need for transportation improvement funds for Penn Station.
The One Washington Plaza developers sought a UDAG funded second mort-
gage. The Prudential made it clear that its development of Gateway III
complex would hinge on the city's ability to secure public funds for
a parking garage. A proposed rehabilitation will go into action only
if the state agrees to house all its Newark employees (some 2,500)
in the building. These are just a few examples of the way the business
community has come to rely on government aid.
There are few complaints about the way Newark has put government
aid to use. The city's application of UDAG funds continues to be
fruitful, and transportation aid has been delivered exactly where needed.
Renaissance Newark officials are apparently aware of the city's solid
track record with government aid and hope to deploy it with comparable
results.
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Comments on Assumption #3
Government aid is not forthcoming. That is the gist of messages
emanating from the White House and Reagan administration emissaries.
Since the conservative administration has come into office, it has
slashed and targeted for cutback a number of traditional aid programs
relied upon heavily by cities.
It appears that the Reagan administration is not sympathetic to
the plight of the nation's older Northeastern urban areas. The popu-
lar reasoning in Washington is that these areas have become obsolete:
they are too expensive to live or work in; their resources have been
almost totally drained; they have become repositories for the poor, the
elderly, and the criminal element. An urban report conducted at the
end of the Carter administration concluded that cities evolve in cycles,
and that the northeastern cities were caught in a downward arc.
Unfortunately, the premise of much of Renaissance efforts is that
funds will be available to supplement or entice private investment.
Many of the studies and planning for downtown redevelopment in Newark
were made during the administration of Jimmy Carter. Since then,
however, Mr. Carter was replaced by Ronald Reagan and a wave of con-
servative legislators in Congress. The new administration immediately
de-emphasized federal aid for a variety of programs, and has advocated
local support and private sector initiative. Already in the first three
months of this administration, programs cut or targeted for dissolution
include UDAG, EDA, and CETA. In some instances, the funds will be re-
placed with block grant funding administered at the state level; in
other cases, the funds will simply cease to exist. Redevelopment
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officials as a result, will be forced to rethink their plans in
order to cope with changing priorities on a national level. With
such apparent reliance on external sources of aid, an important
question to ask is what happens if the aid does not materialize? Some
firms already have devised a response. On one hand are firms who,
with a "business as usual" attitude, have proceeded with their plans
for rehabilitation and expansion. On the other hand are firms whose
behavior suggests they are unaware of the rapid decline of public
resources. An example of the former is Touche Ross, Inc. The Prudential
is an example of the latter.
As recently as April 1981, the Prudential verified that the success
of its project (Gateway III) was contingent upon the city's acquisition
of funds (UDAG of other) or erect an adjacent parking garage. It is
difficult to say whether the Prudential's action represents ignorance
of the current situation, or is a ploy to pressure city hall with its
demands.
The latter alternative becomes more plausible when one considers
these circumstances:
1. Prudential employees, approximately 3,000, will be the
primary tenants of Gateway III.
2. They will move from their present Newark address, a
Prudential-owned building declared by the firm to be
"functionally obsolete".
3. This building will be demolished as soon as the new
quarters are ready.
4. If the city cannot finance the parking garage, the
Prudential will not build Gateway III. Instead, since the
firm will still need office space, the Prudential
will probably take advantage of its suburban properties
west of Newark.
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Thus, the city is placed in a position in which its ability to generate
funds, not that of the private sector actors, becomes the critical factor
in firm (and hence,job) preservation. It seems ironic that the least
resourceful actor in this redevelopment scheme is made to bear so much
of the burden.
Another way of assessing the non-funding situation is to ask just
how necessary outside governmental aid is to redevelopment efforts.
Certainly there are some firms that have moved into, or remained in Newark
under the power of their own resources.
The Gateway I office tower, for example, has been the site of renova-
tions and office expansion. At least three large firms have undertaken
sizeable renovations in order to increase both their office space and the
number of employees in the city.
Touche Ross, Inc. the accounting firm, has its New Jersey headquarters
in Newark. The firm, which has been in Newark since the 1930's, decided
to consolidate its New Jersey staff into Newark. When the expansion is
completed, Touche Ross will occupy 50,000 square feet, nearly twice its
original space; and will contain more than 300 employees. The partner-in-
charge at the firm's Newark office cites several advantages of the move.
First, the company can derive biggest savings from increased efficiency.
Since staffs of the different services are located in one place, they can
coordinate their activities without duplication of effort. Secondly, the
consolidation is more convenient for clients, who can now obtain all their
Touche Ross services in one stop. Finally, the Gateway is situated in the
center of a major transportation system. Touche Rose, in this location,
competes successfully with the amenities of nearby New York City. Touche
Ross executive, W. Donald Georgen, describes the firm's commitment this way:
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"We believe there's a benefit for our clients, our
employees, and the city itself. Consolidation of
our New Jersey operations in Newark represents not
only a move toward improved service on behalf of our
clients but a commitment to the renewed economic
leadership and vitality evidenced in this city".
WNET/Thirteen, the public broadcast station in the area, needed
to expand its facilities in order to realize the station's production
goals for programming in the state. The station invested $750,000 to
expand their facilities at the Gateway to twice their current size.
The new facilities will house modern, sophisticated studios and equipment.
In addition, there will be more space for non-broadcast activities, such
as meetings, call-ins, volunteer and educational projects. This expansion
will be financed as are all WNET projects, through a capital fund-raising
drive aimed at New Jersey corporations, foundations, and individuals.
The Kraft and Hughes law firm provides still another example. This
firm will shortly complete its third internal move since coming into the
Gateway in 1971. At that time thefirm had only two lawyers, but now has
25. The 1980 renovations will consolidate the offices into 1 1/2 floors
instead of thescattered situation on three floors. It will encompass
20,000 square feet. Although the firm has been wooed by developers in
suburban areas, it has remained in Newark because of its particularly
convenient location. Further, the convenience of mass transportation is
an asset to the firm in helping to attract employees and in serving clients.
Finally, the firm notes that the existence of two major law schools in
close proximity to the office are added attractions; they provide access
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to law libraries and are a convenient source of potential staff.
All three firms acted with their own resources, and without
government financial assistance. They have discovered through experience
that Newark and the Gateway are highly convenient, and highly accessible
locations. The cost of doing business in Newark is less than in a
comparable situation in lower Manhattan. Each firm has a history of working
in Newark, and it might be said that roots have taken hold.
There are reasons to stay in Newark and ways to remain that are not
dependent upon government aid. President Reagan has proposed the delivery
of block grants to states for them to distribute, and will reduce or
eliminate traditional sources of assistance. Therefore, firms will have
to develop and employ their own resources. This situation need not foretell
the demise of business activity in Newark. The numerous large corporations
in Newark, especially the insurance companies, regularly invest large sums
in real estate. An informal redevelopment team, consisting of three banks
and two insurance companies in the city, has begun to study and select
possible sites for rehabilitation. The group has set aside $30 million
and is anxious to invest and restore a building downtown -- on its own,
and with no apparent investment by the city.
ASSUMPTION #4: Tax abatement is necessary to make Newark
"regionally competitive".
James Patterson of the NEDC strongly believes in the use of tax abatement
as an incentive to businesses. He feels that tax abatement is a necessary
and appropriate incentive and one of the "equalizers" that will help the
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city appear more competitive within the region. He argues that abatement
in no way gives the city an edge; it merely keeps Newark in the running.
John Maddocks, director of Renaissance Newark, feels the same way.
He can enumerate a long list of the city's advantages, including the
complex transportation network, theindustrial labor force, the availability
of land, and regionally competitive rents. In spite of these, he believes
that tax abatement must lead the list of Newark's busneiss incentives.
He explains that more often than not a potential tenant ignores these
assets but retains a negative image of the city.
The City Council of Newark is another endorser of tax abatement as
a development incentive. In the 20 years since the Fox-Lance Act has been
law, the City Council has consented to all but a couple of the petitions.
Even PSE&G was granted an abatement, despite the fact that there was no
evidence that the utility was in financial trouble, or that it intended
to leave the city. According to some critics, the primary reason PSE&G
received the abatement was that the firm had demanded one. In other words,
the company represents such a formidable influence on the local economy
(or on local officials) that its wishes can be granted regardless of their
impact on the local situation.
By granting tax abatement, the city made possible the construction of
the Blue Cross/Blue Shield building, the Gateway complex, and the expansion
of the Robert Treat hotel. -The insurer could have invested in facilities
in other parts of the state, but was apparently persuaded by the opportunity
for tax abatement (which can only be granted on land legally declared
blighted.
There may have been other reasons for the firms' location decision
in this instance, but to experienced development advisers like Patterson
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and Maddocks, none were more critical to Newark than tax abatement.
Comments on Assumption #4
The business community and some government officials appear to
believe that tax abatement is a necessary incentive for development, or
redevelopment efforts in the city. Briefly, they argue that Newark needs
the incentive just to be able to compete with surrounding communities.
They further contend that tax abatement in no way provides the city with
an advantage. It merely balances some of the disadvantages connected with
Newark.
The Renaissance Newark projects currently in preparation or under
construction have each requested tax abatement. One Washington Plaza will
house the Bell Telephone employees already in Newark. It is not yet known
what wi-ll happen to the building used by that firm now. The Gateway III
building will contain 3,000 Prudential employees, shifted from the company's
Gibraltar building farther downtown. The Gibraltar building subsequently
will be demolished. Finally, the rehabilitation of the Kresge building
is contingent upon the State's commitment to consolidate its 2,500 Newark
employees there. The old offices will simply be abandoned.
Several recent studies shed some light on the related issues of property
taxation, tax abatement, and urban development. These studies are summarized
below, with attention drawn to those findings of particular attention to
the city of Newark.
Impacts of property taxation
In a paper on property taxation and urban land use, the author explains
the taxation dilemma thusly:
The central cities do not possess the fiscal resources commensurate
with their economic responsibilities. There is a ubiquitous impres-
sion that the big cities possess wealth -- looking beyond the CBD.
Beyond theoffice building and department stores are extensive grey
areas where the combination of low-value residential property and
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extremely high population density cancels any fiscal benefits
of non-residential property. 1
It is not difficult to recognize this situation in Newark. As has already
been noted, a Mayor's Task Force concluded that the real property taxpayers,
who account for only 44.8% of the real assessed value of the city, pay
100% of the taxes, hence carrying the full burden for municipal services.
Taxpaying residents are quite aware of this problem; some have moved
elsewhere, while those who remain complain about the dwindling quality
of service delivery.
The author further notes several associations between the tax
rates and other factors. First , he says, there appears to be an inverse
relationship between the volume of commercial/industrial property and the
height of the tax rate. Secondly, he has observed a positive association
between population density and the local property tax rate, i.e. tax
rates are high in densely populated communities. These characteristics,
too, can be found in Newark. They contribute to a situation of rising tax
rates and diminishing revenues. The author concludes that the primary
consequence of the "confiscatory" tax rates is to inhibit development.
The New Jersey Tax abatement law
State legislators evidently were aware of the negative effect of too
high property tax rates, for they enacted a law designed to directly combat
the problem. The Fox-Lance Act of 1961 permits tax abatement to
industrial and commercial development in legally defined "blighted" areas
for a period of up to 15 years. The developer enters into a financial
agreement with the municipality and agrees to an in lieu payment based
upon either 15% of gross rentals or 2% of project costs.
However, the law is interpreted slightly differently in Newark.
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First of all, the NRHA will declare any area "blighted" if the developer
decides to seek abatement. Secondly, all tax abatement in Newark is
granted for the maximum period, 15 years. Thirdly, perhaps most signifi-
cantly, all development projects given tax abatement are charged only
2% of "hard" costs as an annual in lieu payment. According to the law,
the 2% option was to be reserved for only those projects where rental
costs could not be ascertained.
There have beencriticisms that tax abatement is indiscriminately
applied, without regard to the financial circumstances of the firm or the
project. Originally, the largest projects came under the 15% rule, which
was designed to provide payment growth. However, in the last seven years,
only one developer has used that formula, and all others have utilized the
2% level. Thus the city's policy implicitly assumes that each project
requires the same incentive, a "fixed" incentive, described by one critic
as a process of
"granting abatement to some firms which could have paid full
taxes; granting full abatement to firms that could have paid
more than 2% or 15% but' less than full taxes; and losing firms
to other municipalities because the best the city could offer
was property tax abatement 'equal' to 2% or 15%.2
Costs and benefits to the city
The effects of tax abatement are unevenly distributed, and could
potentially leave the city in a financial predicament. Specifically in
Newark, more than 2/3 of all the city's abatement revenues are derived
from only 3 properties, while the remaining 1/3 is produced by some 27
operating properties. Obviously, most development is on a small scale.
Furthermore, should the tenants decide to move, or simply become delinquent
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in payments, the city's revenues would suffer critically.
A cost-benefit analysis of tax abatement, conducted for NEDC, outlined
direct and indirect impacts of abatement. As costs to the city were the
cost of supplying municipal; the delayed growth in the city's tax base; the
cost in terms of tax equity. Designated as benefits were the in lieu pay-
ments; payroll taxes; state business taxes later returned to the municipal-
ities; increased employment; increased economic activity; multiplier and
spillover eceonomic effects. Generally, the study concluded that abatement
payments alone are not sufficient to cover the cost of municipal services.
Only when each firm's in lieu payment is combined with its payroll tax
liability, does the firm's payment to city equal its cost.
The city will losesome 20 to 40% of full taxation over the 15 year
abatement period. It is estimated that in 1977 Newark lost $7.9 million
in property tax revenues from the 30 tax abated projects. This figure
represents 13% of the city's 1977 property levy. Secondly, the Fox-Lance
payments are frozen over the 15 year period, while the are simultaneous
change in the cost of municipal services, local needs, and other sources
of revenues. Finally, no development has "lived" beyond 15 years, and
some development officials are fearful that when the advantages of abatement
(as well as depreciation and interest schedules) fades, the companies may
move away or abandon entire buildings.
A decision on the utility of tax abatement is subject to conclusions
about other preliminary factors. Clearly, there are benefits to the developer:
reduction of tax liability and a fixed liability for a period of 15 years.
But should every developer be entitled to abatement? The city is deprived
of revenues during construction andduring the abatement period. The muni-
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cipalities have no enforcement authority to bring to bear against delinquent
tenants. The multiple small projects often create fewer than 20 jobs.
In summary, the impact of the three Renaissance Newark projects will
be to:
1. upgrade facilities;
2. bring employees to safer facilities, more convenient to
transportation routes;
3. precipitate the abandonment of at least three downtown
office buildings.
For the most part, the move from one building to another cancels any
increased revenues to the city . There is no indication that jobs will
have been created for Newarkers. And there is still room for debate as
to whether or not any impacts will be felt beyond the CBD.
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The Newark Renaissance is about to commence. The preliminaries
have been accomplished: a planning organization of public and private
sector actors has been extablished, the construction projects have been
planned, and the.necessary financing is in place. The groundbreaking
on the first project is imminent. Participants will continue to pursue
government funds and the commitment of resident firms to remain in the
city, while observers will begin their watch, waiting for promised
benefits and unanticipated results.
The ostensible purpose of this paper has been to describe the origin
and prospects of the organization known as RENAISSANCE NEWARK, INC., but
the primary concern of this research effort was to examine the broader
issues associated with an innovative approach to urban renewal. This
paper was written to explore the implications of the type of redevelop-
ment program embodied by Renaissance Newark. The basis of Renaissance
is the belief that economic development in the central business district
is the first and most critical step toward overall city revitalization.
This premise is fortified by a number of assumptions whose accuracy
vis.-a-vis. Newark is vital to the success of the Renaissance methodology.
The task of the paper thus far has been to assess where those
assumptions "fit" with an empirical picture of the city. The paper has
revealed a sizeable divergence between the assumptions held by the creators
of Renaissance. To wit: when Renaissance asserts that the new office
space will generate jobs for Newarkers, it was proven that Newarkers, due
to their limited skills and education, do not work in white collar firms.
Less than half of all working Newarkers are employed in the city; those
who do in most cases work in the factories of the Ironbound or the
69
industrial meadowlands. Renaissance assumes that benefits will filter
down and out to the rest of the city. Unfortunately, the trickle
down theory implies a long term payout, and the long term is a luxury
the city does not possess. In addition, the revitalization in the
downtown will need to be massive in order to generate enough jobs,
revenues and goodwill necessary to reverberate throughout the rest of
the city. Renaissance officials assumed that government aid is forth-
coming, but President Ronald Reagan refuted that assumption as soon
as he took office. The conservate administration he heads is apparently
little concerned with the problems and traditional forms of assistance
that the older cities have come to rely on for their existence.
Already targeted for reduction or elimination are the budgets for UDAG,
EDA, mass transportation, CETA, and various forms of social welfare.
Finally, the creators of Renaissance are convinced that tax abatement
is necessary to make the city competitive on a regional basis. While
it is true that Newark does not offer the settings and amenities impor-
tant to developers today, it is not evident that the city has employed
tax abatement in a cost-effective manner.
Clearly, each assumption is flawed. The existence of the flaws
suggests that the creators of Renaissance based their proposal not so
much on the current situation in Newark as on their perception of a
Newark that exists only within the CBD. The proposal, with its faulty
premises, contributes to the separation of the city into two entities.
Given this divergence between assumptions and the reality in Newark,
what does the future hold -- for the Renaissance program, for Newark,
and for cities in general?
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At this point in time, it is not possible to respond with the definitive
answer. The Renaissance has not yet happened; unforseen events may alter
both process and outcomes. What can be discussed are the implications of
an intervention like Renaissance Newark. The introduction to this paper
describes it as a plea to Newark , public officials to consider how
they willcommit public resources and to estimate the real costs of their
participation in Renaissance Newark. Hopefully, the evidence presented
above has generated some curiosity on the part of public officials about
their behavior and the true meaning of their involvement in Renaissance
Newark. This chapter, by imagining the possibilities as Renaissance
unfolds, offers a final appeal to the officials who are responsible for
the well-being of Newark and its people.
.IMPLICATIONS FOR RENAISSANCE NEWARK
The evidence presented earlier suggests that Renaissance will indeed
succeed, at least in its own narrowly defined goals. The business
community which participated in structuring the organization was primarily
concerned with the deteriorating conditions where their businesses are
located. They created a program that would capitalize on federal
improvement funds and their own investments to upgrade the area and to
make it a more desirable (i.e., safe and profitable) place in which to
do business. It looks as though those goals will indeed be met. The
train station areas improvement projects have already begun at the Erie-
Lackawanna station. Several firms have invested in the rehabilitation
of their own buildings or in properties strategically located in the
downtown. The businesses have secured UDAG mortgages and the support
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of the public sector (for example, with promises of increased police
protection around office buildings). Already in the redevelopment
pipeline are the construction of two new office buildings and the rehab-
ilitation of three more. The downtown will have a new facade of glass
and chrome. Renaissance will take much of the credit -- deservedly or
not-- because of the overlapping relationship between its Board of
Directors (five of whom are CEO's of the largest Newark firms), the
individual investment activities of local firms, and the projects
instituted by the Chamber of Commerce. All these entities will participate
in some way in an economic revitalization of downtown Newark. The rein-
forcement each body receives from the constant contact with the others
will insure the cooperation and success of Renaissance Newark, Inc.
On the other hand, Renaissance will probably disappoint those who
read the proposal as the beginning of an overall, citywide redevelopment
plan, for the program will far short of that objective. First of all,
those who crafted the organization, and who wield the most influence
over its activities, are the business community. Their interests in a
renaissance have already been explained. Their concern with Newark is
a parochial one, limited to the area defined as the CBD. Secondly, the
way in which the projects will evolve suggests that redevelopment will
be oriented to the needs of the firm - not the city. Even within the
CBD, the projects are strategically situated close to commuter access
routes. The preliminary to each project was the acquisition of trans-
portation imppovement funds. The projects reflect the concerns of the
employer, namely, the security of his building, the safety of his employees,
and an orientation toward maximum convenience for non-residents whether
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employee or customer.
Should the commuter orientation be permitted to assume the predom-
inant position as a location decision rule, the outcome is potentially
disastrous not only for the city, but for the downtown as well. For what
the Renaissance activities will therefore produce is not district-wide
development within the CBD, but two "pockets" of development at either
end. If Renaissance plans proceed as they currently exist, the CBD will
not survive as a solid, multi-square block area. Instead, it will emerge
as two nodes situated around the transit centers that connect non-residents
with the city.
At the core of the redevelopment plan are improvements to the train
station areas. At one end of the CBD, therefore, will be
*Erie-Lackawanna train station improvement
*Rte. 280, a six-lane highway that runs east-west through Newark
and the western suburbs
*James Street Commons, a cluster of rehabilitated brownstones located
three blocks from the train and one block from the new office
buildings; the relatively low-priced units have been targeted for
a middle income "professional" Newark employee and family. The project
is heavily endorsed by the Chamber of Commerce.
*One Washington Plaza, the 18 stroy office building scheduled to open
in 1983 and 70% leased up to date.
At the southern end of the CBD, the Renaissance plan proposes
*Penn Station area improvements
*Rte. 21 improvements, a north-south highway passing through the city
*Riverfront park and open space two blocks from the train station
*the new PSE&G headquarters which opened with full occupancy in 1980
*the proposed Gateway III, to be situated near Gateway I & II, and
connected to the train station by means of another overhead tunnel;
to be built and chiefly occupied by the Prudential, but with
subsequent demolition of an existing officie building closer to the
center of the CBD
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In between these two areas there is almost no development activity save
the demolition of randomly located buildings and the proposed desertion
of others (e.g. the Bell Telephone offices when those employees move into
One Washington Plaza, the Public Service building, when that staff moved
around the corner, and the state building whan those employees move up
to the rehabilitated Kresge building on Broad Street). The execution of
these plans portend the fracture of the central business district and
the swift decline of those firms not situated at either train station.
The retail frims and ancillary services who built their businesses
around the city's large firms will be particularly hard hit. These
businesses include the remaining two department stores, the luncheonettes,
dry cleaners and shoe repair shops, the bakeries and card shops. These
are the businesses who have come to rely on the patronage of the employees
of the insurance companies, banks and utilities to survive. And so it
would be to these proprietors that the city addresses its counter proposal.
City officials should alert these business persons to the inherent
danger in the implementation of the existing Renaissance plan. Public
officials who are troubled by the possibility of disjointed development
might incite the concern of the small business owners and then encourage
them to apply some pressure on the major firms who direct Renaissance
activities. It appears that either some small business persons were
not consulted, or that very few of them them have considered the impact
of Renaissance Newark o their particular livelihood. City officials
must therefore, exercise some foresight and accountability in order to
preempt plans that would successfully fracture the business district.
In addition, public officials should strive to balance development
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in the central business district. Officials can emphasize development
properties in diverse parts of the district instead of merely the two
extremes. They can encourage and technically aid the rehabilitation
of the Kresge building (located almost dead center in the CBD) and the
renovation of the state building nearby. The officials can ally them-
selves with businesses representing minority interests in an attempt
to redirect the development pattern. In general, the public sector
must recognize its responsibility and capability to intervene in order
to rescue the central business district from the apperant bisection
which can surely lead only to long-term failure of Renaissance efforts.
IMPLICATIONS FOR NEWARK
Renaissance's whole thrust is the central business district. Even
when it ventures beyond those few blocks, it manages to overlook the rest
of the city and moves to the markets beyond. It seems, therefore, that
Renaissance's efforts willcontribute to and perpetuate the "two cities"
phenomenon in Newark. For as far as business leaders are concerned ,
there is only one "viable" Newark worthy of time and investment, and that,
of course, is the central business district. The consequence of a
continued division within the city may be to nullify the gains made
by Renaissance. Dr. George Sternlieb of the Rutgers University Center for
Urban Policy Research has described what he calls the "twin cities"
development as a core group possessing "a critical mass; it can generate
business, restaurants, and so on". But, the high income eere ,tiwhinh will
be credited with increasing the city's "allure" -- is surrounded by
what he views as "what increasingly is a very disturbing wasteland".
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He concludes that what eventually evolves is
"success breeding success -- but it has increasingly
little to do with the remnants of the older indus-
trial city around it. And the incongruity leads to
increasing friction between the city of glamour --
the people with money who are living the good life--
and the losers who are left behind. They live
cheek-by-jowl, but there's incredible discontinuity".1
It is not necessary to imagine the "discontinuity" present in the city
of Newark. The irony is that a redevelopment plan, one that allegedly
will benefit the entire city (eventually), serves to divide the people
further. The business community is apparently unwilling, and the
resident community unable, to come together on the needs and possible
remedies for the city. The public officials, who might be looked upon
as an impetus that can bring these factions together, has defined its
roled as passive and other-directed. For as long as the prevailing
attitude around city hall is that "the purse string holder sets the
agenda", the needs of the indigenous population will not be addressed.
However, there are opportunities to "bridge" the cleft between
the twin cities with elements in existence right now. The specific
areas where it might be possible to draw the two factions closer together
include the schools, the use of tax abatement and the increasing involve-
ment of other neighborhoods.
Already in place in the city are school advisory boards composed
of educators and business persons from the larger firms downtown, a
Task Force on Education sponsored by the Chamber of Commerce, and staffed
by business executives, and numerous subject-oriented advisory teams
created by the Board of Education. Currently, these bodies meet on a
regular basis, talk about problems, but rarely produce solutions.
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The members of these teams, especially from the private sector, should be
assigned real tasks and then given the authority to fully represent their
firm's and to commit resources toward bettering the educational environ-
ment in the city. MOreover, each firm should prepare itself to "adopt"
a school, and to provide that school with managerial expertise, materials
financial aid and "hands-on" experience -- in other words, all the factors
that may help a student retain an interest in school and a desire to succeed.
Those committees that accomplish little and/or duplicate the efforts of
other committees should be abolished. Finally, no firm should be allowed
to believe that a biennial contribution to the Parents'Teachers Association
represents support and interest in the public school system. The firms
need to begin to look at Newark as a pipleine for future employees, and t
to act accordingly, i.e. by providing training, internships and scholar-
ship aid. Once the firms have made a real investment in education, they will
see a change: in the dropout rate, in higher numbers searching for jobs,
and better qualified applicants. Then, Renaissance will truly be able to
say that the new office space it generates will benefit Newark residents.
Public officials need to reconsider the usage of tax abatement. Several
studies summarized in Chapter 4 demonstrate that the city'psblaAkktt
application of the incentive has cost Newark thousands of dollars in
deserved revenues. A first step in a better direction would be for
public officials to evaluate the use of tax abatement in similar communities
like Seacaucus, Perth Amboy or Jersey City.~ Find out when these cities
employ abatement, under what conditions, and with what guarantees from
the benefitting firms. CIty officials need to know how they can leverage
development activitiy and revenue-generation through the use of tax
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abatement, and how to reject an application for abatement with out losing
an interested firm. Cities across the state have found success with
the incentive, yet have not compromised the city's value. In a word,
city development officials must become more risk-oriented and less passive
in their negotiations with the business community. The city maintains
some valid and highly attractive characteristics, and development officials
must learn to rely more heavily on them (e.g. transportation access,
cheaper rents than NEw York City, availability of land) than on the
prohibitively costly tax abatement program.
The expansion of Renaissance to include other Nawark neighborhoods
demands that first the existence of these neighborhoods be recognized
by public and private development officials, and then the potential of
these areas be highlighted. In several wards the housing stock is still
viable and the blocks are visually attractive. Instead of housing investment
contiguous to the CBD, business leaders should be encouraged to
invest in housing (when they express their intention to do so)in the
North ward or Weequahic. Moreoever, the CBD is not not the only location
of businesses. The same kinds of investment opportunities made available
to big businesses downtown should be made accessible by public officials
to the smaller firms scattered throughout the rest of the city. These firms
are as much in need of technical assistance and financial aid as are the
more prominent, and are probably less able to to secure the necessary
funding. It should be the responsibility of the public sector to see that
funds and other forms of local assistance are distributed on a more
equitable basis. Neighborhood organizations and community leaders can be
introduced into this process as the ones to make decisions about neighborhood
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goals and needs. Nonetheless, it should remain the responsibility of
city officials to insure the distribution of necessary services
in all parts of the city.
IMPLICATIONS FOR CITIES
Public/private cooperative effort has become a popular, if not
inevitable, formula for urban revitalization. Traditionally, public/
private joint venture has meant that the public sector provides infra-
structure, investment capital and tax incentives, and in return, the
private sector agrees to build a plant and hire local workers. But in
Newark, there was joint venture with a slight twist: the city held
up its end of the deal, but the private sector is under no obligation
make gQod on its promises. Almost unbelievabley, the city is without
provisions to enforce. an agreement with members of the private
sector.
For example, there is no provision in the tax abatement law that
would grant the city the authority to collect revenues owed on abated.
properties. The state law omitted an enforcement clause. In addition,
the law specifies that a certain number of local residents must be hired
with each tax abated project. But inspectors from MPDO have found firms
not in compliance, and shrugging off the matter with a plea that "we
searched, but could not find anyone qualified".
As the pool of public resources declines, the city will grow
increasingly more dependent upon the private sector . Many more
activities will become "joint ventures" for the simple reason that the
public sector will not have the necessary resources to provide for itself.
The issue is whether the city will have to compromise its integrity or
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its charge to uphold the public trust in order to access the financial
backing it needs from the private sector.
In order to avoid a situation like the one in which Newark has
lost itself, cities will have to decide in what ways they can cooperatively
participate with the business community in redevelopment efforts.
From the beginning, public officials will need to define their role and
their expectations. They will also need to enact measures that provide
them with the ability to enforce the agreement, and to act with strength
if the private sector fails to perform responsibly.
Renaissance Newark, in isolation in the center of despair and
deterioration known as Newark, can only succeed for as long as it maintains
the boundary between downtown and the rest of the city. The line is thinly
drawn and subject to the appeasement of local residents and the ongoing
passivity of local officials. Without doubt, a renaissance is a timely
and needed event. What those involved must determine is whether they can
allow it to continue as it has been designed, devoid of interaction
with the rest of the city. Can "two cities" exist amiably within the
geographic boundaries of one? Does Newark dare take the opportunity
to find out?
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